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INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY IN PENNSYLVANIA-
A CONCEPT IN EVOLUTION
BY J. H. KLEINFELTER*
At common law there could be no tort liability between husband and wife.
It has been said that the historical genesis of this prohibition was probably
a mixture of biblical and medieval metaphysics, the position of the father in
the family under Roman law, the natural concept of the family as an informal
unit of government with the physically stronger person at the head, and the
property law of feudalism.' Probably some combination of these factors
resulted in the English common-law theory, viewing husband and wife as one
person or "one entity." Prosser suggests that "it is perhaps idle to speculate
at this late date ' 2 as to the exact historical basis of interspousal immunity
since, "all this state of affairs belonged to a social order which has been dead
for more than a century. Beginning about 1844 statutes known as Married
Women's Acts or Emancipation Acts were passed in all American jurisdic-
tions, which were designed primarily to secure to a married woman a separate
legal entity and a separate legal estate in her own property."3
Yet, it is not so idle to speculate; for despite the trend toward emancipa-
tion provided by the Married Women's Acts, some last vestiges of the
common-law theory have been preserved. The prevailing view in the majority
of American jurisdictions refuses to recognize, as separate property, a right
in tort for injury to the person.4 In Pennsylvania, the immunity has been
continued by case law and by the following statutory proviso:
Hereafter a married woman may sue and be sued civilly, in all
respects, and in any form of action, and with the same effect and
results and consequences, as an unmarried person; but she may not
sue her husband, except in a proceeding for divorce, or in a proceed-
ing to recover her separate property; nor may he sue her, except in
a proceeding for divorce or in a proceeding to protect or recover his
separate property; nor may she be arrested or imprisoned for her
torts.
5
This Article will examine the problems which have been spawned by
and pervade this legislation. Commencing with a discussion of the underlying
public policies relating to interspousal immunity, the Article will then focus
* A.B., 1961, Gettysburg College; LL.B., 1964, Dickinson School of Law; member,
Pennsylvania Bar.
1. See PROSsER, TORTS 671 (2d ed. 1955).
2. Id. at 672.
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 673
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1950). (Emphasis added.)
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on specific problems which have arisen: the tolling of the statute of limita-
tions, the point of imposition of the immunity, the point of dissolution of
immunity, the meaning of "a proceeding to protect or recover separate prop-
erty" and the effect of joinder of third parties.
PUBLIC POLICY
As has been suggested, the basis for interspousal immunity is largely
historical, premised on the one entity theory of husband and wife. If the
husband and wife were really one entity, then any injury inflicted by one
upon the other would create in the same person a right to recover and a
liability to respond in damages-an anomaly. Theoretically, then, if a husband
harmed his wife he would be obligated to pay damages to himself.6 Without
debating the logic of this argument, it is reasonably clear that as a practical
matter the typical husband and wife relationship is financially interwoven.
A co-mingling of monies and property and a sharing of benefits is the rule
rather than the exception. Thus, any verdict rendered against one spouse in
favor of the other must be at once both a detriment and benefit to the family
entity with the most likely result being a monetary standoff.
In addition to the legalistic theory of one entity, 7 there are other con-
siderations more contemporary and more properly categorized in the realm of
public policy. By far the most important of these policy considerations is
that policy which seeks to preserve domestic peace, harmony and marital
happiness by prohibiting interspousal litigation.
8
Another policy argument for maintaining this immunity requires the
assumption that the defendant spouse is only a nominal defendant with his
insurer being the real party in interest. Removal of the immunity, it is argued,
would lift the flood gates on collusive and fraudulent claims.9 The reasoning
6. 1 HARPER & JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 643 (1956).
7. Justice Musmanno has termed this theory a "palpable impossibility." Meisel v.
Little, 407 Pa. 546, 551, 180 A.2d 772, 775 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
8. See Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 119, 145
A.2d 716, 717 (1958).
One of the curious incongruities which has resulted under this policy is the fact that
a great number of courts will allow interspousal actions for intentional torts. See cases
collected in Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflict of Laws:
Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. PITT L. REV. 397, 401 n.14 (1954).
Likewise, the alternative remedy through criminal prosecution which is frequently
suggested, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619 (1910), may give some psycho-
logical satisfaction to the wife and redress to society, but it will hardly contribute to the
peace and harmony of the home.
9. See Parks v. Parks, 390 Pa. 287, 296, 135 A.2d 65, 71 (1957). See also Ford,
Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in the Conflicts of Laws: Law and
Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. PITT L. REV. 397 (1954).
New York has an interesting solution to the problem of fraud in interspousal
personal injury actions where one spouse has negligence liability insurance. In
1937 the New York legislature enacted simultaneously with a statute giving either
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presupposes that spouses may become overzealous in finding tortious acts in
the conduct of an insured spouse. 10
Still another pro-immunity policy which requires an assumption of the
existence of insurance and incorporates the one entity theory is that policy
which views recovery by one spouse as a benefit to the defendant tort-feasor
spouse. When liability on a verdict is assumed by an insurance company and
monetary damages are paid to the "one entity," the result will be recovery
by the wrongdoer for his own wrong. Such a result is universally sought to be
avoided."
Interestingly, the insurance factor has been advanced as an argument for
the dissolution of interspousal immunity. The advocates of this approach
recognize the existence of insurance as the great equalizer, offsetting the
antagonistic policy concerned with the preservation of domestic felicity. The
argument is advanced that so long as an impersonal third party, i.e., the
insurer, is the buffer of the brunt of a judgment, then a verdict rendered
against one spouse can have no adverse effects on family unity. Conversely,
such recovery will serve as a monetary balm to soothe and promote the
tranquility of the domicile.' 2 Aligned against the foregoing policy is the deeply
entrenched policy of Pennsylvania, viewing as prejudicial any mention of
insurance at trial. This policy stems from the fear that juries would tend to
favor plaintiff verdicts over the impersonal and supposedly "wealthy bene-
factor" image projected by insurance companies. 18 On the other hand, the
policy underlying interspousal immunity goes procedurally to the institution
of suit and not to the conduct of the trial or admission of evidence. Thus, the
apparent conflict in policies could be resolved by limiting the allegation of
insurance to the pleadings, i.e., to stating a cause of action, but by continuing
the bar against such evidence reaching the ears of the jury at trial.
spouse a right of action against the other for personal tort, a statute which
provides that a liability insurance policy shall not cover any liability of an
insured for injuries to or death of his spouse unless express provision for such
coverage is included in the policy. Thus, New York allows interspousal personal
tort actions but liability insurance policies ordinarily exclude liability to one's
spouse.
35 TEMP. L.Q. 107, 109 (1961).
10. See Long v. Landy, 60 N.J. Super. 362, 158 A.2d 728 (1960). See also 35,
TEMP L.Q. 107, 109 (1961).
11. See Stitzinger v. Stitzinger Lumber Co., 187 Pa. Super. 453, 144 A.2d 486
(1958). Neiman v. Watkins, 81 Dauph.Co..Rep. 344 (Pa. C.P. 1963). Here, contributory
negligence of the wife barred recovery by the husband for damage to the automobile
owned by the entireties.
12. Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 553, 180 A.2d 772, 776 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
On the basis that liability insurance is almost invariably involved in interspousal suits
for damages inflicted in automobile accidents, Oklahoma allows such litigation. Courtney
v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 401-04, 87 P.2d 660, 667-70 (1938).
13. See Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 550, 180 A.2d 772, 774 (1962).
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TOLLING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
When a cause of action accrues between spouses during coverture, does
the statute of limitations begin to run immediately, or is it tolled until the
disability to sue is removed? The answer requires an examination of the inter-
relation of the limitations acts with the Married Women's Acts, the case law
under these acts with the common law, and turns finally on the type of action
which is brought.
The Act of March 27, 1713,14 after enumerating various limitations on
actions provides:
That if any person or persons who is or shall be entitled to any such
action ...be, or at the time of any cause of such action given or
accrued, fallen or come shall be . . .feme covert . . .that then such
person or persons shall be at liberty to bring the same actions, so
as they take the same within such times as are hereby before limited
... after . . . discoverture ... as other persons.
The essence of this "saving clause" provision is to hold an action in
abeyance until the removal of the disability. Seemingly clear on its face, the
law was not to remain free from subsequent complication. Although the Act
of 1713 included a limitation period for trespass on the case which includes
an action for personal injuries, 15 the Act of June 24, 1895,16 expressly limited
such an action to two years without benefit of a "saving clause."
With the passage of the Act of June 3, 1887,17 conferring upon married
women the right to sue and be sued as if they were not married, whatever
validity the savings clause in the Act of 1713 may have retained for actions
other than personal injury was cast into doubt. In Nissley v. Brubaker's
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Act of June 3, 1887, "operated
as a repeal of the proviso in the limitation Act of March 27, 1713, which
prevents the statute of limitations from running against married women until
they become discovert."'19 The court considered this conclusion "inevitable
because a right to sue is fundamentally inconsistent with a disability to sue
and by consequence removes the disability." 20 To the same effect was Hick's
Estate,21 "where the object and reason for which a statute was passed is
removed by a later enactment, there is an implied repeal of the former
statute.
22
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 35 (1950).
15. See Hasson v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 1 Pa. County Ct. 531 (1886).
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1950).
17. Pa. Laws 1887, at 332, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1950).
18. 192 Pa. 388, 43 Att. 967 (1899).
19. Id. at 392, 43 Atl. at 968.
20. Ibid.
21. 7 Pa. Super. 274 (1898).
22. Id. at 280.
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These opinions suggest that when the reason for the savings clause has
been vitiated by subsequent legislation, namely, the Married Women's Acts,
the "savings clause" legislation must fall by the wayside. The logic of these
statements can hardly be disputed; nevertheless, they have little pertinence
when applied in the framework of inter-spousal litigation. This is so for the
reason that "no right to sue" was conferred to spouses, inter se, by the Act of
1887 and its successors.
What is the current state of the law? Regarding personal injury claims
it has been noted that the Act of June 24, 1895, limiting personal injury claims
to two years has no savings clause.23 Cases construing this legislation have
held that such actions are not protected from the running of the statute.2 4
Thus, a spouse is forever barred from suing a tort-feasor spouse, if coverture
continues for more than two years after the injury.
On the other hand, all cases other than those for personal injuries and
those allowed by the Married Women's Acts remain valid under the savings
clause.2 5 Indeed, there is authority that even without the statutory savings
clause the tolling of the statute of limitations was authorized in these cases
by the common law.26 However, no common law case to this effect was found
involving an action for personal injuries.
2 7
IMPOSITION OF IMMUNITY
The fact that the status of coverture may come into existence at any point
along a sequence of events-injury (contract breach), institution of suit, trial,
judgment or appeal creates another problem. At what point is imposition
of the bar demanded? Considering the basic underlying public policy, one might
assume that that stage of the proceedings which begins to rend asunder
the domestic tranquility is most critical.
In the recent case of Ondovchik v. Ondovchik,2s the court was presented
with these facts. Plaintiff, female guest occupant of an auto, brought suit for
personal injuries sustained by her, against the operators of two other auto-
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (1950).
24. See Walker v. Mummert, 394 Pa. 146, 146 A.2d 289 (1959) ; Ditch v. Baylor, 7
Lebanon 33 (Pa. C.P. 1959); Tocus v. D. & H. Ry. Corp., 35 Luz. L.J. 167 (Pa. C.P.
1940); Hasson v Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 1 Pa. County Ct. 531 (1886).
25. See Lineweaver's Estate, 284 Pa. 384, 131 Atl. 378 (1925) ; Kennedy v. Knight,
174 Pa. 408, 34 Atl. 585 (1896) ; Gracie's Estate, 158 Pa. 521, 25 Atl. 1083 (1893).
26. See Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170, 173 (1863) ; Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 S. & R.
84, 91 (Pa. 1826).
27. In Cardamone v. Cardamone, 9 Pa. D. & C. 723 (1927), (personal injury
action) the court cites Kennedy v. Knight, 174 Pa. 408, 34 Atl. 585 (1896), which was
an action on a promissory note, for the proposition that "the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the right of action is complete." Cardamone v. Cardamone, supra at
729. It is suggested, however, that the cases cited supra note 24 are controlling.
28. 411 Pa. 643, 192 A.2d 389 (1963).
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mobiles involved in the accident. One of the latter joined the operator of the
car in which plaintiff was riding as an additional defendant. Thereafter, but
prior to trial, plaintiff married the operator of the car in which she had been
injured. A jury verdict was rendered solely against the operator of plaintiff's
car, who was at that time her husband. In a 4-3 decision, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order setting aside the verdict with
the resulting effect that a wife recovered against her husband.
Because two reasons were assigned for the majority's holding, its underly-
ing logic is somewhat obscured. The opinion first excludes the case from the
operation of the prohibition because the suit was instituted before coverture.29
This would seem to fix the "critical stage" as the institution of suit. The
opinion continues, however, with a discussion of the effect of joinder.30
In essence, it is stated that if a wife does not sue her husband directly and if
the eventual verdict is rendered solely against her husband as a result of the
fortuity of joinder and the fortuity of a jury verdict then, "the mere presence
of a husband or a prospective husband as an additional defendant in a suit
does not bar recovery." 31 The court interestingly observed that the statutory
prohibition states that a wife may not sue her husband; it does not say
"may not recover against her husband." 32
The fact situation presented by Ondovchik was not the first to raise the
"critical stage" question. Only a year earlier in Meisel v. Little,3 3 the plaintiff,
female guest passenger was similarly injured in an auto driven by her prospec-
tive husband. Here, however, the suit was brought after marriage and solely
against the husband-defendant. As to this sequence of events, the immunity
was held applicable and a bar to recovery.3
4
One might be justifiably puzzled by the Ondovchik result. The rule that
interspousal immunity is inapplicable so long as suit is instituted before mar-
riage defies reason. Surely, it is only after the institution of suit that the
blows to domestic tranquility will-if at all-be struck. The testimony at trial,
the money verdict, the judgment and appeal all seem to be equally crucial
stages. It would seem, therefore, that to allow recovery at any stage after the
occurrence of coverture would defeat the policy of the prohibitory proviso.
35
29. Id. at 646, 192 A.2d at 391.
30. Id. at 647, 192 A.2d at 391.
31. Ibid. Note how the court does not limit this statement to the facts of the case,
viz., to a "prospective husband"; but, also makes it equally applicable to a "husband."
32. Id. at 647-48, 192 A.2d at 382. (Emphasis added.)
33. 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962).
34. Accord, Borzik v. Miller, 399 Pa. 293, 159 A.2d 741 (1959) ; Lipschultz v. Kohl,
16 Pa. D. & C. 386 (1931). In Cardamone v. Cardamone, 9 Pa. D. & C. 723 (1927), the
sequence of events were substantially the same as Ondovchik. Holding the immunity
applied, the court made no distinction between suit brought before or after marriagei
Ondovchik would seem to have overruled Cardamone.
35. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1950).
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The distinction made by Ondovchik based on the date when suit is
brought, viz., prior to marriage, may no longer be valid. In the recent case of
Daly v. Butterbaugh,8 6 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania deemed it neces-
sary to reconsider, in detail, its holding in Ondovchik. In a statement which
can only be accorded the weight of dictum, since the Dalys were married at
the time of their accident, Justice Jones, speaking for the court, noted:
The distinctions between Meisel and Ondovchik are not of such
nature as to justify the application of two different rules. First,
whether the husband's tort occurred prior to or during coverture
should be of no moment; the impact in the family relationship
is the same and the public policy which denies the right to maintain
an action for a tort occurring during coverture applies equally to the
denial of the right to maintain an action for a tort occurring prior to
marriage.37
Of course, the main distinction between Meisel and Ondovchik was not
when the tort occurred-in both the tort occurred prior to marriage-but
when the suit was brought. Still, considering public policy, the distinction is
nonetheless specious. In any event, although the Daly case may properly be
deemed to overrule Ondovchik on other matters, it would seem that the
distinction drawn permitting interspousal litigation so long as the action is
instituted prior to marriage is still valid.
DISSOLUTION OF THE IMMUNITY
The question is posed, what eventuality during coverture will serve to
lift the bar of immunity without offending the underlying public policy?
Various possibilities are suggested; among them are voluntary separation,
desertion, divorce a mensa et thoro, divorce a vinculo, and death. In addition
to determining which of these events obviates the necessity for continuing
the immunity, it is further material to question-as it is with the imposition
of the bar-at what point in the proceedings the termination of the status
would be effective to allow recovery.
Discoverture by Desertion
In the Act of May 1, 1913,38 there is language which allows "any wife,
who has been deserted, abandoned or driven from her home by her husband"
to sue her husband as if she were a feme sole. The statute is silent as to when
the cause of action must have accrued. Likewise, there is no appellate
authority, relating to personal injury claims, on whether such claim must
36. Daly v. Buterbaugh, 207 A.2d 412 (Pa. 1965).
37. Id. at 417.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 114 (1950).
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have accrued before or after the desertion. Pennsylvania lower courts, how-
ever, do seem to agree that the tort, whether intentional or negligent, must
have occurred after the desertion.
In Candidi v. Candidi,3 9 the court said "[W]hen the only remaining
vestige of marriage is the legal contract and the parties thereto have ceased
to cohabit as a result of a husband's misconduct, we see no reason why the
marital status, in name only, should exempt a wife-beater from answering
in damages for his tortious act."' 40 The assault here occurred after deser-
tion.41 An opposite result was reached in Ellis v. Brenninger,42 where the
tort occurred before the spouse was "driven from her home." Ellis, how-
ever, may be conditioned by the situation presented in Paskevich v. Paske-
vich,43 where, although the assault took place before the plaintiff spouse
was driven from her home, the acts complained of were in effect simultaneous
with the wife's immediate withdrawal.
Appellate cases under the Act of 1913, relating to assumpsit claims,
do not appear to follow the requirement that the action accrue after deser-
tion.44 It should be noted, however, that most of these cases incorporate the
added element that the wife is suing "to protect and recover her separate
property.
' 45
It should be noted that the Act of 1913, providing the desertion exception
to interspousal litigation, is limited to suits brought by a wife and only in
the enumerated instance. The act affords no like remedy for a husband;
nor is there case law which would afford him a remedy under these circum-
stances. 46 Finally, no statutory authority is available on what other events
might serve to terminate the immunity.
Discoverture by Death
Whether the death of one spouse will remove the interspousal immunity
bar to the surviving spouse or to the deceased spouse's estate is also con-
sidered. In the case of Parks v. Parks 47-concerning a suit by an unemanci-
39. 87 Pa. D. & C. 96 (1953).
40. Id. at 100.
41. Accord, Waterman v. Waterman, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 126 (1954) (negligence after
desertion).
42. 71 Pa. D. & C. 583 (1950).
43. 5 Northumb.L.J. 266 (Pa. C. P. 1920).
44. See Gessler v. Gessler, 181 Pa. Super. 357, 124 A.2d 502 (1956). Adler v. Adler,
171 Pa. Super. 508, 90 A.2d 389 (1952).
45. See, e.g., Ertel v. McCloskey, 167 Pa. Super. 120, 74 A.2d 652 (1950).
46. But see, Gabrielli v. Gabrielli, 31 Dauph. Co. Rep. 283 (Pa. C.P. 1927), where
the court stated in dictum that under the Act of June 8, 1893, Pa. Laws at 344, a husband
might sue his wife to recover his seperate estate whenever she may have deserted him or
separated herself from him without just cause.
47. 390 Pa. 287, 135 A.2d 65 (1957).
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pated minor child rather than a spouse-the following dicta is found:
We have, however, recognized that the doctrine of interfamily im-
munity from suit by a member of the family expires upon the death
of the person protected and does not extend to a descendent's estate
for the reason that death terminates the family relationship and there
is no longer a relationship in which the state or public policy has an
interest.
48
The court further stated: "[W]ith death there comes an irreversible end
and termination of the family relationship. .... 49
In Parks, however, the unemancipated minor child was denied recovery,
since she had not in fact been killed, but merely faced a prospective life-
long internment in a state institution. The court refused to equate this situa-
tion with death. Furthermore, the authority upon which Parks relies for the
above quoted dicta is questionable.
Kaczorowski v. Kalkosinski,50 upon which Parks relies, involved an
auto accident in which both husband and wife were killed. The father of the
deceased wife instituted the suit against the husband's estate for the wrongful
death of the wife as a result of the husband's negligence. The court noted
that "the disability of the wife to sue is personal. It does not inhere in the
tort itself as is the case where she is guilty of contributory negligence." 51
"The relation of husband and wife intervening between the tortious act
and a third injured party ought not to defeat recovery simply because the wife
cannot sue the husband for the tort to her. As to other parties there may
be an independent wrong for which recovery should be allowed. '52 It would
seem that this logic would have been more appropriate had the action been
one of survival rather than wrongful death. In any event, dissolution of
interspousal immunity in Kaczorowski was accomplished not because of the
death of one of the party litigants but because of the court's reasoning that
a wrongful death action somehow "interposes" or "once removes" the tort
for which recovery is sought. The wrongful death situation, then, must be
allocated a separate pigeonhole of its own for dissolution of interspousal im-
munity.43
48. Id. at 296, 135 A.2d at 71.
49. Id. at 297, 135 A.2d at 71.
50. 321 Pa. 438, 184 A.2d 663 (1936).
51. Id. at 442, 184 A.2d at 665.
52. Id. at 441, 184 A.2d at 664.
53. Perhaps the real explanation is to be found in the Parks case itself. The
Parks court cited Minkin v. Minkin, 336 Pa. 49, 7 A.2d 461 (1939) (unemancipated minor
versus surviving parent in wrongful death), in which it was noted that such an action is
sanctioned only because it "is a property right granted by the Death Statute and it does
not sanction generally the maintenance of a tort action by an unemancipated minor child
against its parent for damages for acts of negligence affecting the person." Id. at 56, 7
A.2d at 66. (Emphasis added.)
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In Davis v. Smith,5 4 also cited by Parks to support its dicta, the plaintiffs
were a minor son and a widow suing the estate of the deceased parent-husband
for injuries sustained by the boy as a result of the decedent's negligence.
While these facts are more "on point" for the topic under discussion, the
authority cited in Davis is not. In holding that interspousal immunity is
destroyed at death, Davis cites as Pennsylvania authority Kaczorowski,
Gracie's Estate,55 and Doughtery v. Snyder.56 Kaczorowski is distinguishable
because of the wrongful death exception. Gracie and Doughtery are distin-
guishable because both were assumpsit actions. Thus, after tracing the
authority for the dicta in the Parks case, there doesn't seem to be any real
authority at all.
In fact it was not until a year after Parks that the supreme court in
Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co.,57 finally answered the
question of whether a widow could maintain a trespass action against her
deceased husband's estate for personal injuries received by her as the result
of the husband's negligent operation of a motor vehicle, occurring during
coverture. By answering in the affirmative the court laid to rest a con-
troversy which had long raged in the lower courts.
58
Discoverture by Divorce A.V.M.: Absolute Divorce
Another eventuality which could be considered as removing the im-
munity is divorce a.v.m.-a total dissolution of the marriage bond. At least
one Pennsylvania lower court has answered that such is not the case. In
Smith v. Smith,59 an action was brought for injuries received as a result of
an assault and battery occurring during coverture. A divorce a.v.m. was
granted prior to the institution of the suit, but the immunity was held to
continue. No Pennsylvania authority was cited to justify this result. The
Smith case, however, was cited with approval in Stimson v. Stimson,60
sustaining preliminary objections to a bill in equity for an accounting.
54. 126 F. Supp. 497 (1954).
55. 158 Pa. 521, 27 Atl. 1083 (1893).
56. 15 S. & R. 84 (Pa. 1826).
57. 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716 (1958).
58. See Johnson v. Johnson, 38 Wash. Co. R. 158 (Pa. C.P. 1958), where the court
held that immunity continued after death, citing the Fiduciaries Act of 1949, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 320.603 (1950). The act says that "an action or proceeding to enforce
any right or liability which survives a decedent may be brought against his personal
representative alone or with other parties as though the decedent were alive." (Emphasis
added.) The Johnson court reasoned that as public policy prohibited the action if "decedent
were alive" it remained necessary to continue the legal bar after death. Accord, Lewellyn
v. Mensch, 5 Pa. D. & C.2d 67 (1955) (Estate v. Estate). Contra, e.g., Pittman v. Deiter,
10 P. D. & C.2d 360 (1957).
59. 14 Pa. D. & C. 466 (1930) (Northam. Co.).
60. 346 Pa. 68, 74, 29 A.2d 679, 682 (1942).
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In Swaney v. Cabet,6 ' a like result was achieved without any reference
to the Smith or Stimson cases. In concluding that the disability continued
after divorce for torts which occurred during marriage the court first noted
the lack of appellate authority62 and then used the Parks case to justify its
refusal to accept anything but death as the solvent of the domestic harmony
policy. The Swaney court concluded with the observation that an ability
to bring suit if divorced "would undoubtedly encourage divorce in some
cases."
63
In spite of Smith and Swaney, there may yet be some doubt whether
interspousal immunity continues after divorce. The Johnson case,6 4 holding
the immunity dissolved on death, mentions in a closing footnote that the
Smith case is contrary to that result. 65 Were it not for the fact that Johnson
was concerned with death and Smith with divorce, one might be tempted to
conclude that Johnson overrules Smith and that divorce a.v.m. does destroy
interspousal immunity. There is also language in the Dougherty case, which,
as justification for permitting an assumpsit action after death, includes a
citation to an English case, 66 allowing suit after divorce.
Discoverture by Divorce a mensa et thoro: Separation Agreements
Where there is a separation, either by court decree or voluntary, the
parties are, of course, still married in the eyes of the law. As a general
rule, "neither a separation without divorce nor a divorce a mensa et thoro
removes the common-law disability of one spouse to sue the other. ' 67 There
appears to be no reason why this rule should not be followed in Pennsylvania.
However, the Act of 191368 is a statutory exception to this rule. While
the act is limited to cases of desertion, abandonment, or where the wife is
driven from her home, there seems to be no logical reason why interspousal
immunity should be arbitrarily dissolved only in these cases. In a situation
where either spouse has committed an act which would give rise to a valid cause
of action in divorce, and there is a subsequent voluntary separation or
divorce a mensa et thoro, the aggrieved spouse ought to be allowed relief
for the wrongs done to him by the other.69 It would seem the family unity
61. 23 Fay. L.J. 175 (Pa. C.P. 1960).
62. Id. at 180.
63. Id. at 184.
64. Johnson v. Peoples First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 394 Pa. 116, 145 A.2d 716
(1958). See text accompanying note 57 mpra.
65. Id. at 124 n.6 145 A.2d at 720 n.6.
66. Marshall v. Rutton, 8 T.R. 545, 101 Eng. Rep. 1538 (1800).
67. 12 AM. JUR. Husband & Wife § 584 (1940).
68. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 114 (1950). See text accompanying note 38 supra.
69. However, some justification for not allowing relief in this situation would be




is already at an end, and that there would be no remaining domestic peace
and felicity to be preserved. Thus, public policy would no longer be served
by prohibiting an interspousal suit for actions which accrued during coverture
or after separation.
PROCEEDING TO PROTECT AND RECOVER SEPARATE PROPERTY
The next question presented is whether a cause of action for personal
injuries is "separate property."
In Thompson v. Thompson,70 a provision of the District of Columbia
Code7 ' similar to that of Pennsylvania 72 was construed. An authorative
dissent by Justices Harlan, Holmes and Hughes observed:
If the husband violently takes possession of his wife's property and
withholds it from her she may, under the statute, sue him, separately,
for its recovery. But such a civil action will be one in tort. If he
injures or destroys her property she may, under the statute, sue
him, separately, for damages. That action would also be in tort. If
these propositions are disputed, what becomes of the words in the
statute to the effect that she may "sue separately for the recovery,
security and protection" of her property?
But if they are conceded-as I think they must be-then Congress,
under the construction now placed by the court on the statute, is
put in the anomalous position of allowing a married woman to sue
her husband separately, in tort, for the recovery of her property, but
denying her the right or privilege to sue him separately, in tort, for
damages arising from his brutal assaults upon her person. I will not
assume that Congress intended to bring about any such result. I
cannot believe that it intended to permit the wife to sue the husband
separately, in tort, for the recovery, including damages for the reten-
tion of her property, and at the same time deny her the right to sue
him separately, for a tort committed against her person.
73
As did the majority in Thompson, most jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania,
have ignored Mr. Justice Harlan's rationale.
74
The result has not, however, gone unchallenged. In an emphatic dissent
in Meisel v. Little,75 Justice Musmanno conducted a challenging analysis
of the question-what is separate property. Citing Walker v. Philadelphia,76
70. 218 U.S. 611 (1910).
71. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1155 (1961).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1950), dealing with right of spouses to sue to
recover their separate property. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
73. 218 U.S. at 623.
74. See Meisel v. Little, 407 Pa. 546, 180 A.2d 772 (1962) ; Borzik v. Miller, 399
Pa. 293, 159 A.2d 741 (1959) ; Shoyer v. Shoyer, 33 Pa. D. & C. 673 (1939) ; Smith v.
Smith, 14 Pa. D. & C. 466 (1930).
75. 407 Pa. 546, 557, 180 A.2d 772, 778 (1962).
76. 195 Pa. 168, 45 Atl. 657 (1900).
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he noted that under the Act of June 3, 1887, 7 7 "the right of a wife in an
action for a tort done to her is her separate property." 78 He further noted
that the rule in California allows a wife's claim for personal injuries against
her husband as her separate property. 79 The English rule, as stated in
Curtis v. Wilcox,8 0 is also in accord with the dissent. In all of the above
cases, Meisel, Walker, and Curtis, the injuries sued upon were sustained
prior to coverture. Whether a cause of action for similar injuries occurring
after the termination of the marriage would be considered "separate property"
is not considered in these cases.
The difficulty with the position taken by Justice Musmanno is that the
separate property provision in the Act of 1887 is of an exemptive nature. 8'
Were this language expanded to the all encompassing interpretation sug-
gested, the primary purpose of this legislation would be largely circum-
vented.
12
Thus, the proper conclusion would seem to be that all trespass actions
based on an unliquidated claim for injuries to the person are not separate
property83 excepting, as above noted, wrongful death and survival actions.8
4




There is an old legal maxim that the law will not permit to be done
indirectly that which it will not allow to be done directly. Accordingly, it
had always been clear that the same rule which prohibited a wife from suing
her husband directly also prohibited her from recovering against him in-
directly where he was joined as a third party defendant. In Fisher v. Diehl,
6
77. Pa. Laws 1887, at 332, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 111 (1950).
78. 407 Pa. at 558, 180 A.2d at 779.
79. Ibid.
80. [1948] 2 K. B. 474.
81. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
82. See Algard v. Algard, 39 Pa. D. & C. 486 (1940).
83. See Chromy v. Chromy, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 291 (1958).
84. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
85. See Stemniski v. Stemniski, 403 Pa. 38, 169 A.2d 51 (1961) ; Lindenfelser v.
Lindenfelser, 383 Pa. 423, 119 A.2d 87 (1956); Geary v. Geary, 338 Pa. 385, 12 A.2d
(1940). But see, Davis v. Davis, 23 Pa. D. & C.2d (1950), disallowing an unliquidated
assumpsit claim as not being separate property, citing, Miller v. Miller, 44 Pa. 170
(1863), which held that an action in covenant to prevent waste and destruction of real
estate was unliquidated and not separate property. Note also that property owned as
tenants by the entireties is not "seperate property"; Mower v. Mower, 367 Pa. 325, 80
A.2d 856 (1957) ; Wakefield v. Wakefield, 149 Pa. Super. 9, 25 A.2d 841 (1952) unless or
until there is an offer to partition or until some violation of the entireties agreement
occurs. Stemniski v. Stemniski, upra; Lindenfelser v. Lindenfelser, supra; Shank v.
Shank, 54 Dauph. Co. Rep. 255 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
86. 156 Pa. Super. 476, 40 A.2d 912 (1944).
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a husband and wife instituted a trespass action against a third party to
recover damages arising from a collision between the husband's vehicle,
operated by him, and the third party's vehicle, operated by his employee.
The third party secured a severance of the actions and joined the husband
as an additional defendant on the theory that the husband was solely or
jointly liable for the accident. A jury verdict was rendered against the third
party and the husband. Passing on the propriety of the joinder, the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court stated:
The action of the court below was not equivalent to permitting an
action by the wife against her husband. Her husband is not a party
defendant to the action as far as she is concerned. The judgment
against him, as restricted by the Court,5 71 is not enforceable by her
nor does it enure to her benefit. It is simply a judgment enuring
to the benefit of the original defendant if he pays or is required to
pay the wife's judgment; and it then requires the husband to pay to
the original defendant only one-half of the damages paid by the latter
as a result of the joint negligence of both.
88
In other words, the joinder of the husband as an additional defendant
was held proper provided that "no execution be issued by the plaintiff [wife]
on the judgment entered against the additional defendant [husband], 'so
that . . . [the wife] may recover only from the original defendant . . . [third
party], and that the .. . [third party], original defendant, may obtain only
contribution from ... [the husband].' "89
In Koontz v. Messer,90 a similar result was achieved by using this same
logic. In that case a wife instituted a trespass action against the employers
of her husband for injuries alleged to have been sustained by her through the
negligence of her husband while engaged in the course of his employment.
On the theory that the husband-employee was liable over to his employers,
the husband was brought upon the record as an additional defendant and
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the wife against the employers and
in favor of the employers against the husband-employee. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the wife, on the theory of respondeat superior,
could sue the employers of her husband even though she could not sue her
husband, since the personal immunity of the husband from suit by his wife
87. The trial court stated that it was its duty "to see that the rights of the parties
are preserved and to control any execution that might be issued on any judgments
rendered, so that (the wife) may recover only from the original defendant, [the third
party], and that the [third party] may obtain only contribution from [the husband]." Id.
at 480, 40 A.2d at 914. (Emphasis added.)
88. Id. at 483, 40 A.2d at 916.
89. Id. at 487, 40 A.2d at 918.
90. 320 Pa. 487, 181 A.2d 792 (1935).
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did not prevent him, as an additional defendant, from being liable by way
of contribution to the third parties sued by the wife.
The distinguishing feature of the Fisher and Koontz cases is illustrated
by the situation presented by the recent case of Kiser v. Schlosser.91 Here,
a wife brought an action to recover damages for personal injuries against
a third party, who, in turn, joined the husband as an additional defendant.
This time a jury verdict was returned in favor of the wife against her husband
alone. It was held that although the husband was properly joined as a
defendant for purposes of contribution in the action by his wife against
the third party he could not be directly liable to his wife.
92
Whatever the propriety of the logic behind the state of the law regarding
joinder and interspousal immunity, as thus far illustrated an abrupt change
occurred with the recent case of Ondovchik v. Ondovchik.93 Over the dissents
of Chief Justice Bell and Justice Jones, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed the trial courts n.o.v. action of setting aside a verdict rendered
solely against the defendant spouse. As in the Fisher case, the plaintiff spouse
did not sue her husband directly but allowed the fortuity of joinder to bring
him into the action. The court said:
The mere presence of a husband or a prospective husband as an
additional defendant in a suit does not bar recovery. The action
proceeds against the original defendants only, exactly as it would
have had the additional defendant not been named. The verdict of
the jury does not change the nature of the litigation; it is rather
the end result and not the equivalent of a suit or action so as to bar
commencement of suit itself.
9 4
It is true that the statutory prohibition uses the word "sue" and not
the word "recover";95 yet, the public policy underlying interspousal im-
munity hardly seems served by such a narrow construction. In addition, the
approach taken by Ondovchik might well open the door to spouse plaintiffs
for "defendant shopping" as a means of circumventing the immunity statute
by the joinder procedure. It is even conceivable that a counterclaim by one
spouse against another might be sought as an exemption from the prohibition,
although at least one lower court case has answered that it should not so
operate.96
91. 389 Pa. 131, 132 A.2d 344 (1957).
92. The court concluded that the error was not prejudicial to the husband and wife
and could be corrected by striking the verdict in favor of the wife against her husband
from the record.
93. 411 Pa. 643, 192 A.2d 389 (1963).
94. Id. at 647, 192 A.2d at 391.
95. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48 § 111 (1950).
96. Coyle v. Coyle, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 32 (1954).
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The difficulties and incongruities presented by Ondovchik were short
lived for in Daly v. Buterbaugh,9 7 reexamination of that rational resulted in
its explicit rejection:
The distinctions between Meisel and Ondovchik are not of such
nature as to justify the application of two different rules ...
[R]ecognition of the right of joinder as an additional defendant in
an action by a wife against a third party is only for the purpose of
protecting the right to contribution of the third party against the
husband and does not create any right in the wife as against her
husband. . . . [I]t is the impact of litigation upon the relationship
of a wife and husband which our case law and public policy proscribe,
and vice versa. Lastly, the distinction drawn in Ondovchik between
the verdict-the so-called "end result" of the litigation, and the suit,
the inception of the litigation, is a distinction without a difference.
8
In Daly the husband and wife instituted joint trespass actions against
a third party who, in turn, secured a severance of the actions and joined the
husband plaintiff as an additional defendant. The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the wife plaintiff against both husband and the third party. It
was only the judgment as entered in favor of Mrs. Daly against her husband
which was the subject of appeal and which was reversed. The rejection of
Ondovchik by the Daly case may properly be construed as a return to the
rationale of Koontz, Fisher and Kiser.99
The only remaining situation where the interjection of a third party
or agency might serve potentially to circumvent the statutory immunity is
that concerned with the estate of tenancy by the entireties. What result
should be reached when an estate of tenancy by entireties-as an entity
separate and apart from the husband and wife as individuals-attempts
to sue or is sued for injuries sustained or originated by it? The factor of
tenancy by the entireties has not yet appeared in cases concerned with inter-
spousal immunity, but it has received attention in the area of imputation of
negligence and where unconsionability of recovery by one for his own wrong
is a factor. In both of the latter situations the courts have tended to look
beyond the separate entity concept of tenancy by the entireties to the husband
and wife as individuals.
Thus, while it would be improper to state that the negligence of a guilty
spouse is imputed to the innocent and injured spouse-absent an agency re-
lationship (not created by virtue of the family relation alone) 1°° neverthe-
97. 207 A.2d 412 (Pa. 1965).
98. Id. at 417. Justice Roberts joined by Justice Musmanno filed a lengthy dissent.
99. See text accompanying notes 85, 89, 90 supra.
100. Rodgers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 Atl. 166 (1931) ; Cox v. Roehler, 316
Pa. 417. 175 Atl. 417 (1924) ; Maloney v. Rodgers, 184 Pa. Super. 342, 135 A.2d 88
(1957) ; Fry v. Marconi, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 575 (1959).
[Vol. 69
INTERSPO USAL IMMUNITY
less, recovery is denied on the theory that the guilty party would be re-
covering for his own wrong.101 Consequently, it would appear that whatever
use of the estate of tenancy by entireties might be attempted to circumvent
interspousal immunity would be defeated by the public policy argument of
unconscionability of recovery by one for his own wrong.
CONCLUSION: WHAT THE RULE SHOULD BE
The statute which bars interspousal litigation should be repealed. While
this Article attempts to be objective in its presentation of the present status
of interspousal immunity in Pennsylvania, it is believed that two factors
have been shown to contribute heavily in favor of repeal. First, the under-
lying public policy supporting the retention of immunity have little or no
value in today's modern society. Second, the wealth of exceptions, many
of them inconsistent with the basic-policies, have created confusion,
uncertainty and may even spawn procedures which constitute fraud upon
our courts. Anyone agreeing that the "knowne certaintie of the law is the
saftie of all" and that fraud upon our courts in domestic relations cases is
already too plentiful will concur in such a repeal.
101. See Stitzinger v. Stitzinger Lumber Co., 187 Pa. Super. 453, 144 A.2d 486
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